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production  process.  The favorable employment  effects  alone  should  be 
justification enough to eliminate these monopoly import licenses. 
2.  The expansion of  the tree crop sector. Indonesia has cheaper  labor than 
Malaysia,  and  with  additional  investments  in  transportation,  Indonesia 
could potentially  outcompete  Malaysia  in  the  production  of  rubber  and 
palm oil. In addition to earning  more foreign exchange, the  strategy of 
accelerating the growth of agricultural export industries will also promote 
a more equitable rural-urban,  as well as inter-island,  growth pattern  and 
ease population pressure on the urban areas. 
A final cautionary  word  on external debt management  from the political 
perspective is pertinent.  The Pertamina crisis has led to close supervision by 
the  Ministry  of  Finance  of  external  borrowing  by  all  state  enterprises, 
making  it  unlikely  that  a  debt  crisis  would  ever  again  emerge from  the 
external adventurism of an economic fiefdom. The danger now  may be the 
absorption  of  private  external  debts in  order to  save  large  domestic  firms 
when  they  get  into financial  problems,  as in  the  Indocement  case. As  we 
described  in  chapter  3,  in  July  1985  Indocement,  the  biggest  cement 
company in Indonesia, began to experience cash flow problems because the 
recession-induced  collapse of the construction industry led to a cement glut. 
The response of the Indonesian government was to inject U.S. $325 million 
in  cash  to  acquire  a  35  percent  share  of  the  company,  and  to  form  a 
consortium  of  four  state banks  to  “convert  into  a  rupiah  liability  a U.S. 
$120 million syndicated loan that Indocement took out in  1981.’16 
If  a  few  more  such  rescues  are  allowed,  then  the  habit  may  well  be 
impossible  to  break  without  the  government  having  to  put  to  the  test  an 
important source of its political power-the  cohesiveness of the bureaucratic 
and  military  elite.  Given  the  widespread  participation  in  large  private 
business  ventures  by  government  officials  and  their  family  members,  the 
selective use of financial rescue will threaten the political unity of the group. 
If  such  political  pressure  were  able  to  completely  eradicate  the  already 
blurred  line  between  public  and  large  private  enterprises,  then  the 
vulnerability  of  Indonesia  to  a  debt  crisis  would  be  greatly  increased. 
External debt management would become impossible because no one would 
know what the size of the sovereign debt really was, and the size of this debt 
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Wing Thye Woo is responsible  for writing chapters  1,  3, 4, 6, 7, and 8. These 
chapters are partially based on three earlier papers:  “The  Dead Hand of  History in 
Indonesian Economic Policymaking”  and “The External Debt Situation in Indonesia: 
Performance  and  Prospects”  (no,  43  and  no.  48,  respectively,  in  the  Applied 
Macroeconomics  Working  Paper  Series  issued  by  the  University  of  California, 
Davis); and  “The  Economic  Policy-Making  Equation  in  Indonesia”  (Pacific Rim 
Studies  Program  Working Paper  no.  6, University  of  California,  Davis).  Anwar 
Nasution is responsible for writing chapters 2 and 5. These chapters draw on some 
materials from “Instruments  of Monetary Policy in Indonesia after the 1983 Banking 
Deregulation”  (a  paper  prepared  for  the  Conference  on  Financial  Research  in 
Indonesia, August  1986) and from Financial Institutions and Policies in Indonesia, 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1983. 
Chapter 1 
1. The “balanced”  budget rule ceased to be a binding constraint on expenditure 
after  the  1973 OPEC-1 price  increase.  The Indonesian  government  (perhaps  until 
very recently) was pretty much able to get whatever amount of credit it wanted. This 
budget rule does not prevent the  financing of  nonbudgetary expenditure  by  money 
creation, e.g., central bank credits to state agencies. 
2.  The term  “Dutch  disease”  originated with the observation  that the  1973-78 
growth of the Dutch natural gas industry was accompanied by a steady decline in the 
traditional export sector. 142  Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution 
3.  In  the  case  where  a  private  borrower  could  not  come  up  with  the  service 
payments in domestic currency for his private nonguaranteed external debt, we do not 
consider it a national debt crisis because the government did not cause the default 
except  in  the  broadest  sense  of  not  creating  more  favorable  macroeconomic 
conditions, if  it were able to do so. 
4.  This is calculated assuming that Indonesia would pay the same effective interest 
rate as Mexico. 
Chapter 3 
1.  Sachs (1985) argues that it is political considerations which explain why Latin 
American  countries,  but  not  the East  Asian countries,  pursued exchange  rate  and 
trade policies which rendered their economies vulnerable to an external debt crisis. 
2.  Other viewpoints on the political economy aspects of Indonesian policymaking 
are: Jackson (1978a,  1978b), Palmer (1978), Mortimer (1974), Glassburner (1978), 
and Liddle (1987). 
3.  This characterization-  of state-society relations is developed in Wing Thye WOO 
(1988). His article  also reviews  and tests the competing  models of the Indonesian 
state. 
4.  Since 1961 there has been a secular decline in the real money stock. See table 
11.8 in Amdt (1971). 
5.  We  postpone discussion of the reorganization of the external debt to chapter 7. 
6.  This figure is not strictly accurate because multiple official exchange rates for 
different types of transactions still existed at this time. Data is from Arndt (1966). 
7. This was calculated by  deflating the dollar earnings of  nonoil exports by  the 
dollar  export  unit  value  of  the  industrial  countries.  The  absence  of  a  reliable 
representative  exchange  rate  for  1965 makes  the  calculation  in  local  purchasing 
power impossible. 
8.  The annual real GDP growth rate of  the industrialized countries averaged 5.5 
percent in  the three years prior to  1965 and averaged 4.9 percent  in  the  1965-68 
period. 
9.  This  coup is commonly referred  to as the GESTAPU coup,  with  GESTAPU 
standing for Gerakan September  Tiga Puloh-the  September 30 Movement. 
10.  For example, he maintains a working farm for recreational purposes. 
11. The great care which Soeharto takes to preserve his country-boy image is seen 
by the POP affair. POP, a popular culture magazine, claimed in  1974 that Soeharto 
was actually a descendent of  the  Yogjakarta royal  family. Instead of  ignoring this 
gossip which would only add to the legitimacy of his rule among the superstitious 
and conservative peasants, Soeharto publicly rebuked the close confidant who owned 
the magazine. 
12.  See Timmer  (1975) for an excellent discussion  of  the political economy  of 
Indonesia’s rice policy. 
13. Dwifungsi is a transliteration of “dual function”  and refers to the army’s dual 
role  in  defense  and  economic  development.  Harold  Crouch  (1978)  cites  official 
statements in  1969 and  1970 that the  armed forces budget  covered only  30 to 50 
percent of expenses. 
14. Access to these funds may be the reason the defense budget has not jumped 
dramatically in the face of continued military operations in East Timor. 143  IndonesidNotes 
15.  Another important reason for the use of  quotas over tariffs is that tariffs would 
16.  See The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekfy, 1 December  1986. 
17. INSIGHT, 9 February 1987, p. 33. 
18. Bank Indonesia, embarrassed by the size of the rescue operations, delayed the 
release of information about its financial status for over a year. 
19.  Soekarno, Soeharto’s predecessor, had resorted to the inflation tax to pay for 
government operations. 
20.  Glassburner (1976) cited this as an instance of  managerial incompetence, so 
he may disagree with our interpretation here. 
21.  Siregar (n.d.,  5) noted that  “it was generally believed that while the Dutch 
colonial rule had a stifling effect on autochthonous Indonesian entrepreneurs, it had 
fostered the entrepreneurial  activity of the Dutch and other foreigners, particularly 
the Chinese.” 
22.  In  the  preface  to their  book,  Panglaykim  and Palmer  (1969)  advanced  the 
proposition  that  state  corporations  could  be  used  to  provide  a  counterweight  to 
Chinese  domination  of  the  private  trade  sector.  (Zaibatsus were  large  holding 
companies that dominated the Japanese economy until the end of World War 11.) 
violate the GA’IT  agreement. 
23.  Liddle (1987) labels the two groups economists and engineers, respectively. 
24.  An  account  of  IGGI’s  role  in  the  1966-70  period  is  given  in  Posthumus 
(1971). 
25.  Because  of  their  influential  foreign  constituency,  their  lack  of  ideological 
aversion  toward  foreign  investment,  and  the  fact  that  several  of  them  received 
doctorates  from  the  University  of  California,  the  technocrats  were  called  the 
“Berkeley  Mafia”  by  their detractors. 
26.  Two earlier  attempts  to  check Pertamina’s  influence had  failed.  When  the 
minister of mining attempted to assert his control over Pertamina in 1969, Soeharto 
transferred the company out of the minister’s jurisdiction. In  1971 Soeharto ignored 
the recommendation by  a presidential commission  on corruption that Pertamina be 
placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. 
27.  The term “technician”  is used because of the increasingly prominent role of 
Minister of Technology Habibie, who is an outstanding aerospace engineer. 
28.  This belief is evident in the following editorial in a magazine identified with 
the military advisors to the president: 
One [path of economic development]  leads via the BAPPENAS technocrats to a 
free-flight and laissez fake pattern of development  in  the Western and American 
fashion. Another [path] takes the form of cooperation with Japan on the basis of 
one’s own strength without loans from the IGGI, the IMF and the World Bank with 
Pertarnina  as  guarantee.  (Ekpres,  18  January  1974,  quoted  in  Fur  Eastern 
Economic Review, 4 February 1974) 
Chapter 4 
1.  The Indonesian government made this change beginning with  1984185 but did 
not  revise  the  figures of  earlier years,  so  our revision  merely  makes  the  official 
categories consistent across time. 
2.  Real import tax revenue, measured in 1980 prices, fell by Rp 62 billion in the 
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3. The rise in  oil tax revenues in  1983/84 is illusory because the 1983 devaluation 
increases the rupiah value of this revenue, which is paid in U.S. dollars. 
4.  Nonmining RGDP is used  instead of  RGDP because while the presence of oil 
and LNG industries increases a region’s production tremendously, their impact on the 
region’s income is small. This is because almost the entire revenue is taken by  the 
central government and, being extremely capital-intensive industries, their local wage 
bills are small. 
5. Jakarta is excluded here because its high figure “reflects the substantial level of 
spending on the apparatus of the Central Government rather than on the development 
of Jakarta”  (World Bank  1984, 133). 
Chapter 5 
1979 are found in  Nasution (1983) and Suwidjana (1984). 
1. More  detailed descriptions  of  the  Indonesian  financial markets from  1970 to 
2.  A fuller discussion of the new monetary instruments is in Nasution (1986). 
3.  This  liquidity squeeze has  been  immortalized  in the  Indonesian  press  as the 
Sumarlin shock treatment, Gebrakan Sumarlin. 
Chapter 6 
1.  See Corden and Mackie (1962) and Kanesa-Thasan (1966) for analyses of  the 
Indonesian exchange rate system prior to the Soeharto years. 
2.  Glassburner (1970)  and Pitt  (1971) describe  the  pricing  of  foreign exchange 
during the transition to the unified exchange rate. 
3.  The low figure of  6.4 weeks for 1975 shown in table 6.2 was not because of  a 
sharp drop in exports or a big increase in imports; it was because of the transitional 
financing of  Pertamina’s  debts  while  negotiations  were  underway  to  convert  the 
company’s short-term debts to long-term debts. 
4. On the eve of  the devaluation, Arndt (1978, 10) wrote: 
The overall picture for Indonesia’s balance of payments in the current fiscal year is 
thus  still  reasonably  reassuring.  On  a  longer  view,  it  is  difficult  to  resist  the 
traditional balance of payments pessimism of economists everywhere, official and 
unofficial alike. 
5. See stories in  Warta Berita, April 6; Sinar Harapan, April  13; and Merdeka, 
May 5 and May 24. 
6. An  exponent  of  this  view  is  Kincaid  (1984,  88), who  wrote  that  the  1978 
“exchange rate adjustment”  was prompted by “the balance of payments constraint.” 
7.  Notable supporters of the Dutch disease interpretation of the  1978 devaluation 
are Malcolm Gillis, Dwight Perkins, Michael Roemer, and Donald Snodgrass (1987, 
539) who wrote: 
[In 19781 the country had  ample foreign exchange reserves to defend the vale of 
the rupiah, and the business community viewed devaluation as unthinkable. 
Nevertheless,  the Indonesian rupiah was devalued by  50 percent in  November 
1978, not to protect a precarious foreign exchange reserve situation but primarily 
to encourage labor-intensive manufactured and agricultural exports. 145  IndonesidNotes 
8.  These normalizations were suggested by  Peter Warr (1986). 
9.  This  statement  is  true  as  long as  international  prices  do not  rise  above  the 
domestic  prices  of  the  quota-protected  goods.  Tariff-protected  goods  are  still 
considered tradables because their domestic prices are higher than international prices 
only by the amount of  the tariff and they move in tandem with international prices. 
10. The OPEC-1 price increase occurred in October  1973. 
1  I. Pangestu (1986) constructed  several price  indices for tradables  and nontrad- 
ables by decomposing the gross domestic product, the CPI, and the WPI. Her results 
are qualitatively the same as those reported in table 6.5. 
12. The Morgan Guaranty measure of  competitiveness  is the  inverse of  the real 
exchange rate reported in World Financial Markets published by  Morgan Guaranty. 
The unit of  measurement of  competitiveness  here  is rupiahs per  basket  of  foreign 
currencies. 
13. Kincaid (1984) and Pangestu (1986) provide formal econometric explorations 
of the devaluation. 
14. We  have. as Gillis (1984) did in his table 4, identified the  “miscellaneous” 
category in the World Bank list of nonoil exports as manufactured goods. 
15. These  disaggregated  nonoil  export  data  are  available  only  in  fiscal  year 
intervals.  Fiscal year  1979 goes from April  1979 to March  1980 and is henceforth 
represented by  1979/80. 
16. McCawley (1980) discusses  the  need  for other  economic policy  changes  in 
order for the beneficial structural effects of the devaluation to be viable. 
17. Debt here refers to medium- and long-term external public debt. 
18. International Financial Statistics,  June 1987. 
19. International  Financial  Statistics,  June  1987. The IMF, at the  beginning of 
1987, further lowered  its prediction  of  the  1987 growth  rate  to  2.3 percent  (IMF 
1987). 
20.  Even after taking into account the fall in  import prices, the real price of oil 
measured in terms of foreign purchasing power fell a whopping 40 percent  in one 
year. 
21. In this section, we confine our attention to the consequences of  quotas on the 
supply of exportables within a static setting. For an excellent discussion of the impact 
of  protection on growth, see Corden (1972). 
22.  Pitt (1971) and World Bank (1981) are two comprehensive studies of effective 
rates of protection in 1970 and 1975, respectively. 
23.  As  pointed  out  in  section  6.4, goods  with  QR  protection  are  effectively 
sheltered from international price trends and are hence regarded as nontradables from 
an analytical viewpoint. 
24.  This is not the total level of protection as this figure does not take into account 
activities protected by quotas and tariffs. 
25.  See Wall Street Journal,  24 November  1986 for a longer list of  vital  inputs 
with a small number of approved traders. 
26.  Figures are from The Asian Wall Street Journal  Weekly, 1 December  1986. 
27.  This assumes that the rent-seeker is rational enough not to demand too high a 
28.  We  are abstracting from natural growth considerations here to make this point 
29.  Current account expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
price and obliterate the industry. 
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Chapter 7 
1.  The  conversion  to  rupiah  was  done  using  the  average  BE  Market  rate  of 
October  to December,  99.5 rupiahs/dollar.  The average curb market rate  was  130 
rupiahsldollar. Data are from the World Bank (1968), Basic Data section and pp. 39, 
50, and 54. 
2.  Lipsky (1978), Glassburner (1976), and McCawley (1978) are excellent sources 
about and analyses of  the Pertamina crisis. 
3.  According to Glassburner (1976), the power installation at the Krakatau Steel 
Mill cost three times more than the same installation in Taiwan. 
4.  These  figures  are  only  guesses  because  the  same  item  from  three  official 
sources-balance  of  payments,  the  government  debt  record,  and  the  government 
budget-sometimes  shows gaping discrepancies.  See also the note in table  7.4 on 
how the  1973/74 through 1977/78 data were constructed. 
5.  The rate of change in the CPI was 31 percent in  1973, 41 percent in 1974, and 
19 percent in 1975; and real GDP growth was 7 percent in  1976, 9 percent in  1977 
and 8 percent in  1978. 
6.  This paragraph draws upon the article by Haryono (1985). 
Chapter 8 
and Rivera-Batiz (1985). 
1.  A textbook exposition of this fiscal cause of external debt crisis is Rivera-Batiz 
2.  For example, see table 17.5 of Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz (1985, 557). 
3.  For example, Dombusch (1987), Lever and Huhne (1986), and Cline (1984). 
4. Cuddington  (1986),  Dooley  (1986),  Khan  and  Haque  (1987),  and  Morgan 
5. This is calculated assuming that Indonesia would pay the same effective interest 
6. Quote is from the Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 July 1985. The Asian Wall 
Guaranty (1986). 
rate as Mexico. 
Street Journal Weekly, 12 May 1986, put the cash injection at U.S.  $360 million. 
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